Since the return to democratic governance in 1999, violent conflicts around identities including religion, ethnicity, indigene/settler differentiation and resource control remain a challenge to peace in Nigeria. Thus far, responses of government lack a normative framework to motivate consistent intervention and foster peace. While the 1999 Constitution identifies peace as a common aspiration, there is a deficit of a non-adversarial institutional mechanism to address violent identity related conflicts in Nigeria. Despite its limited relevance, the visible institution for conflict management is the court. This article argues the need for the establishment of a panel of the wise, a conflict and peace intervention mechanism, as an "essential" for Nigerian constitution. It then explores key considerations in terms of the composition, functions and legal status of intervention of the proposed panel for the management of violent conflicts associated with identity and fostering peace in Nigeria.
However, the above efforts by the state to tackle the sources of recurring violent conflicts portray an approach that denies the reality of a structural problem which cannot be addressed as a one off-event. 28 The approach lacks a legal basis or framework to motivate a consistent management of identity related conflicts and foster peace in Nigeria. In particular, the 1999 Constitution which though identifies peace and stability as a common aspiration of the state 29 lacks a non-adversarial mechanism that can intervene to prevent or mediate identity based issues before they morph into violent or full blown armed conflicts. Rather, what is visible is the court, which is generally vested with the power to adjudicate disputes arising from legal right, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue. 30 Yet, a sole reliance on the court ignores its limitation in promoting peace and security. 31 It contrasts with the view of Ogunyemi, calling for an expansion of "people"s choices in every relevant way" in order to tackle security challenge in Nigeria. 32 It betrays the reality that violent conflicts arising from clash 21 E Onwudiwe "A pan-African agenda for the national conference", available at: <http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/371.html > (last accessed 4 September 2014). 22 DA Amaraegbu "Violence, terrorism and security threat in Nigeria"s Niger Delta: An old problem taking a new dimension" (2011) and liberties of citizenship that majorities are to respect. 35 Michelman defines commitment to the implementation of rights and laws and their effective administration as "constitutional essentials" for a state. 36 In Elster"s view,
"essentials" of constitutions should, at the very least, "define and protect the rights of the citizens" and "establish the machinery of government". 37 Along similar lines, Rawls notes, the constitution, should contain arrangements which are appropriate for reconciling conflicting opinions about rights and justice. 38 On the essential institutional framework for resolving conflicting opinions of rights and justice, interpretation of rights as well as the exercise of powers among organs of governance, the argument of Raz is instructive. Viewing the protection of basic rights as essential to protect "collective goods" 39 which arguably include peace, 40 Raz explains that the court is particularly competent to deal with conflict of rights affecting individuals and the functioning of organs of governance. 41 The institutional case for the court as an appropriate forum to safeguard "This time, the victorious plaintiffs went to the entire village of the defendants with maniacal rage and vengeance, burning every building standing there, destroying every crop standing there and turning the place a desolate waste.
Thereafter they set about partitioning the entire village to themselves. The defendants" village ceased to exist. This happened even though the two villages had intermarried for centuries. In fact the sister of the champion of the defendants was and is still married to the champion of the plaintiffs."
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The fact that intervention is only possible when parties initiated actions in the courts and "the winners take all" approach of the judgment reveal the pathetic outcome of relying on courtroom litigation and decision for addressing resource related conflict. It hints that the reliance on the court alone as the bearer of constitutional duty to resolve claims in such conflict scenarios may not always help in achieving peaceful resolution. Even though the process is non-technical and adversarial, the relevance of customary law and institutions for solving violent conflicts linked to identity is limited in terms of certain aspects of their process and outcome.
The limit of customary institutions as an "essential" for resolving identity-based conflicts
First, in relation to the application of customary law through informal channels such as the palace courts, official intervention and manipulation are not ruled out as a result of dependence on the state for income. 72 Also, since it is usually removed from any official accountability, the role of traditional rulers in such mechanism can be subject to dictatorship and corruption. 73 Largely dominated by the male, it remains patriarchal with the result that the voices of women are either unheard or altogether excluded in the dispute settlement framework in traditional settings. 74 Second, the dispute management strategies often generated by such institutions are localized and cannot be generalized beyond local boundaries. In relation to interventions by traditional institutions, Osaghe argues, where located in ethnic groups, they may be seen as a continuation of ethnic domination by one ethnic group of another and further exacerbate conflicts. 75 Third, generally, the application of customary laws presupposes parties who share similar customs, a feature which may not apply in the case of ethnicity or religion based conflicts where parties may not share similar customary values let alone laws. This signifies that if applied to conflicts associated with identity, there is a risk that a people involved in identity based violent conflicts may be held liable by a custom they do not adhere to. Hence, the likelihood that different customary law may be personal to different participants in violent conflict situations is a disincentive for relying on customary laws and institutions. Finally, even in communities with known customary laws, the possibility cannot be ruled out that what is projected and applied as customary laws is not the living customary law but the official version which may do more harm than good. Scholars including Bennet distinguish "official customary law" from "living customary law". The former, largely traced to the advent of colonialism, refers to rules imposed by external authorities without local support and lacks legitimacy while the latter is not fixed in any written codes and is dynamic. 76 In terms of outcome, the application of the former, indeed, may operate as a potential source of conflict escalation.
In all, the foregoing arguments illustrating the weaknesses of courts and customary institutions in terms of their process and outcome undermine the reliance on these infrastructures as the sole institutional essential for conflict management and justify the need for an alternative conflict management mechanism as a complement. This with a conflict prevention and management role is necessary and will help to realise the national aspiration on peace and stability. As a result of its bi-partisan nature, the proposed panel should be saddled with the responsibility of stepping into burning issues stemming from identity before they escalate into violence and armed conflicts. This is pertinent as conflict situations in Nigeria are not sudden. Rather, as it has been argued, their root causes are often traceable to historical injustices which were allowed to fester due to lack of effective attention by political elite. 159 In relation to full blown violent conflicts, the panel functions should include facilitation of mediation efforts involving affected stakeholders. This may require third party intervention such as mediation. Creating such a role for the panel in the constitution will afford it the legitimacy to serve as first point of call to participants in conflict as well as a neutral go-between in conflicts involving government and any other organised groups.
Experience from the National Peace Council (NPC) of Ghana shows that a mechanism such as the panel of the wise, can be useful in preventing or tackling complex conflicts. Even before officially inaugurated, the NPC has been credited in preventing or containing conflicts during the 2008 elections and earned the reputations as credible non-partisan institution. 160 The influence of the NPC has extended to the regional parts where the Regional Peace Advisory Councils (RPAC) have been able to identify and mediate local conflicts early and so contain their escalation. The RPAC has thus become important early warning mechanisms in Ghana.
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Fostering peace
Fostering a culture of peace in an identity based society is a huge, yet a surmountable challenge. In addressing this challenge, the importance of peace education as stressed in several official documents of United Nations organizations such as UNESCO in 1974, 162 1980, 163 1994/95, 164 1996, 165 and the United Nations General Assembly in1978, 166 1995, 167 1996, 168 1999, 169 and 2002 170 is useful. The UN Declaration on Culture of Peace and its programme encourage member States to take actions for promoting a culture of peace at the national level as well as at the regional and international levels. 171 Reinforcing the importance of peace to the well-being of people in Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples" Rights (African Charter) equally guarantees the right of individual to national and international peace. 172 Although the Nigerian Constitution does not codify peace as a human right, it is state party to the African Charter which recognises the right to national and international peace. 173 When the provision of the Charter is read along with its aspiration for peace and unity expressed in the constitution, there is basis to encourage peace education as critical for creating an atmosphere needed for meaningful governance. Hence, the responsibility for the promotion of peace can be anchored in the panel. Entrusting the panel with such constitutional role will provide or advance appropriate framework to encourage peace education as a means of building the culture of peace in Nigeria.
An example of what this can achieve is again discernible from Ghana, where the NPC has embarked on series of workshops aimed at making youth become ambassadors of peace. 
